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JAMES TSABORA*

Illicit Natural Resource Exploitation
by Private Corporate Interests in
Africa’s Maritime Zones During
Armed Conflict
ABSTRACT
In periods of war, African states experience great difficulty in defending maritime zones from criminality because the legal and institutional infrastructure, which guarantees the safety and security of
the zones, is often highly compromised. Major maritime commercial
corporate interests are exploiting economic opportunities that arise
in these compromised coastal states due to war. Some of the most
common exploitations of marine resources are illicit fishing, extraction of minerals, and illegal dumping of toxic substances in the territorial waters of maritime states. Such unlawful exploitation is
detrimental to Africa’s economic integrity and well-being. Corporate
accountability for these criminal activities would guarantee a measure of economic integrity and secure a state’s economic welfare. Increasing evidence of illicit exploitation in maritime states during
periods of conflict necessarily calls for the elaboration of the rights
and responsibilities of private maritime corporations in foreign waters under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and
further highlights a great need for international criminal penalties
for such exploitation. This article investigates whether the relevant
international legal and institutional frameworks can be relied upon
to prevent illegal natural resource exploitation of Africa’s maritime
zones during periods of armed conflict, and proposes a strategy for
criminal sanctions against this conduct.

INTRODUCTION
Valuable African natural resources on land and at sea have been
the target of constant exploitation by international commercial corporations, particularly during periods of war. In May of 2013, the Africa Progress Panel1 published an Africa Progress Report,2 which showed that
* James Tsabora is a lecturer at Midlands State University (Zimbabwe). He received
his LLB from the University of Zimbabwe in 2006, his LLM from the University of
KwaZulu-Natal in 2010, and was a PhD and Post-Doctoral Fellow at Rhodes University in
2013.
1. The Panel consists “of ten distinguished individuals from the private and public
sector who advocate for responsibility between African leaders and their international partners to promote shared equitable and sustainable development for Africa. Mr. Kofi Annan,
former Secretary-General of the United Nations and Nobel laureate, chairs the APP and is
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between 2008 and 2010, Africa lost US$63.4 billion from illegally earned,
transferred, and unrecorded private financial outflows more than it received from foreign investment and aid combined (US$62.2 billion).3 Following the report, the African Development Bank chief, Donald
Kaberuka, emphasized that “Africa is being ripped off” by foreign resource corporations that are “extracting Africa’s mineral resources at
huge profit for shareholders with scant reward for local populations.”4 It
is unclear whether most of the exploitation is through legal or illegal
channels,5 but a substantial volume of these activities are conducted during war—outside the regulatory capacity of African states.6
The Africa Progress Report claims that over the last three decades,
high levels of the illegal exploitation of Africa’s natural resources resulted from private commercial actors, whose illicit activities pose huge
threats to Africa’s economy.7 These threats, it can be argued, are continually present due to the general weaknesses in the international and domestic laws that govern Africa’s maritime zones, hence posing serious
questions about whether Africa is sufficiently equipped to minimize further exploitation. Of the relatively few conflicts in Africa’s maritime
states, the conflict in Somalia has generated the largest sense of weari-

closely involved in its day-to-day work. . . . The Panel facilitates coalition building at the
highest levels to leverage and to broker knowledge, break bottlenecks, and convene decision-makers to influence policy and create change for Africa.” AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL,
AFRICA PROGRESS REPORT 2013—EQUITY IN EXTRACTIVES: STEWARDING AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES FOR ALL 2 (2013), available at http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/08/2013_APR_Equity_in_Extractives_25062013_ENG_HR.pdf.
2. “Published every year, the Africa Progress Report is the Africa Progress Panel’s
flagship publication. The report draws on the best research and analysis available on Africa
and compiles it in a refreshing and provocative manner. Through the report, the Panel
recommends a series of policy choices and actions for African policymakers who have primary responsibility for Africa’s progress, as well as international partners and civil society
organizations.” Id.
3. Id. at 66.
4. David Smith, Africa Ripped Off Big Time by Resource Firms, Says Bank Chief, THE
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/
2013/jun/18/africa-ripped-off-foreign-resource-firms.
5. For instance, one of the Africa Progress panelists, Strive Masiyiwa (Zimbabwe),
commented that some of the concerned companies are guilty of disregarding “ethics and
human lives” and that by “cheating the system, they make work harder for honest business.” Press Release, Africa Progress Panel, Africa’s Natural Resources Could Dramatically
Improve the Lives of Millions (May 10, 2013), available at http://www.africaprogresspanel
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013_PRESS_RELEASE_Equity_in_Extractives_ENG
.pdf.
6. See Laurence Juma, ‘Shadow Networks’ and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa 16:1 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2, 5 (2007); Michael Renner, The Anatomy of
Resource Wars 162 WORLDWATCH PAPER 1, 10 (2002).
7. See Kofi Annan, Foreword to AFRICA PROGRESS PANEL supra note 1, at 7.
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ness within the international community. A copious amount of literature
now exists on this and scrutinizes the political crisis in Somalia from various perspectives, including state failure, maritime piracy, illegal fishing, and other humanitarian angles.8 One of the recurring themes from
such literature is that private maritime corporations have shown an increased readiness to engage in illegal economic activity around Somalia
by taking advantage of the prevailing political instability.9 This illegal
economic behavior includes illegal fishing and illegal dumping of toxic
substances in the waters around Somalia.10 Somalia’s conflict generally
illustrates the illicit natural resource exploitation activities that have occurred in Africa’s conflict areas in the last two decades. In other parts of
the continent, illicit resource exploitation during conflict has not only ended with the plundering or looting of existing natural resources by state
actors, but has also included the predatory and illicit profit-seeking economic activities of individual persons, criminal networks, and entities in
conflict states.11 Illegal corporate and commercial activities by indigenous and multinational private corporations have taken forms such as
illegal joint venture schemes,12 sub-contracting in exchange for mineral
resources,13 racketeering activities,14 smuggling and trafficking of mineral

8. For a large body of literature of this kind, see PIRACY STUDIES, Academic Literature,
http://piracy-studies.org/literature (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
9. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, The Pirates of Somalia: Opportunistic Predators or Environmental Prey?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 377–381 (2010).
10. Stig Jarle Hansen, Debunking the Piracy Myth: How Illegal Fishing Really Interacts with
Piracy in East Africa, 156:6 RUSI J 26, 30 (2012).
11. It should be stated that there has not been a universally accepted definition of the
term “illegal natural resource exploitation.” The definition adopted by the United Nations
Security Council-appointed Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Wealth of the Congo was fiercely contested by politicians and scholars
alike. See U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other
Wealth of the Congo, ¶14, U.N. Doc. S2001/357 (Apr. 12, 2001), available at, http://www.un
.org/news/dh/latest/drcongo.htm. See also Francois Grignon, Economic Agendas in the Congolese Peace Process, in DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND
PEACE, 74–85 (2006).
12. Juma, supra note 6, at 5.
13. See PHILLIPPE LE BILLON, WARS OF PLUNDER: CONFLICTS, PROFITS AND THE POLITICS
OF RESOURCES 151–57 (2012) (discussing the use of private military companies to secure
natural resource rich areas in return for payment in form of mineral resources). See also
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES AFRICA, PEACE, PROFIT OR PLUNDER: THE PRIVATISATION OF
SECURITY IN WAR-TORN AFRICAN SOCIETIES 7 (Jakkie Cilliers & Peggy Mason eds., 1999),
available at http://www.issafrica.org/publications/books/01-jan-1999-peace-profit-orplunder-the-privatisation-of-security-in-war-torn-african-societies-j-cilliers-p-mason-eds.
14. Philippe Le Billon, Getting it Done: Instruments of Enforcement, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND ACTIONS 215, 215–17 (Ian Bannon & Paul
Collier, eds., World Bank 2003).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN103.txt

184

unknown

Seq: 4

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

25-APR-14

8:50

[Vol. 54

resources from conflict states to industrialized countries,15 and the international exchange of natural resources smuggled from conflict states
through covert methods.16 Therefore, there is little doubt that more effective international and domestic regulatory frameworks must be established and implemented in order to stop this general phenomenon.
It is in view of the situation depicted above that one could argue
that war in African coastal countries attracts powerful international corporations in search of lucrative opportunities to make profit out of
chaos.17 Thus war and chaos can no longer be regarded as deterrents to
“business.”18 Instead, war in resource rich African states has created opportunities for corporations to engage in “resource theft” and other
forms of illegal natural resource exploitation. This exploitation exacerbates the plight of African maritime states because these economic and
commercial activities bring further instability to conflict states and diminish their chances for quick economic recovery.19 According to one
writer, corporations have enormous power to mask their illicit activities
and pursue profit maximization at all costs, while simultaneously ignoring the human consequences of their actions in war-torn states.20 In terms
of international law, however, and as further expanded upon in later
parts of this article, these exploitations flagrantly violate the territorial
integrity and political sovereignty of affected maritime states and contribute in many ways to illicit war economies.21
Illicit fishing and toxic dumping in Somalia is thus indicative of
the growing trend of illegal resource exploitation activities in Africa’s
conflict zones by private corporate actors and other commercial interests
15. For examples regarding the illegal export of illegally exploited natural resources
from conflict zones to industrialized states in Europe, North America, and Asia, see Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Wealth of the Congo (U.N. Doc
S/2001/357 (April 12, 2001), U.N. Doc S/2002/565 (May 22, 2002), U.N. Doc S/2002/1072
(Nov 13, 2001), UN Doc S/2002/1146(Oct 16, 2002) and U.N. Doc S/2003/1027 (Oct 28,
2003).
16. See Stephen Jackson, Making a Killing: Criminality and Coping in the Kivu War Economy, 29:93 REV. OF AFR. POLITICAL ECON. 517, 519–20 (2002) (discussing the nature of some
of these activities); see also TIM RAEYMAEKERS, INTERNATIONAL PEACE INFORMATION SERVICE,
NETWORK WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONGO’S PRIVATISED WAR ECONOMY 35 (2002).
17. RAEYMAEKERS, supra note 16, at 35.
18. IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH, reprinted in
TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 92 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., Yale University Press 2006) (“It is the spirit of
trade, which cannot co-exist with war. . . .”) (emphasis added).
19. See generally Panjabi, supra note 9.
20. Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2002).
21. See Tulio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments Off the Coast of
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 405 (2009).
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that are directly and indirectly linked to ongoing wars or parties to such
wars.22 The prevalence of economic agendas in these conflicts leads
scholars to suggest the existence of a “dialectic nexus” between war and
illegitimate commerce in Africa’s conflict zones.23 There are abundant examples of illegal economic activity taking place during armed conflict
not only in Somalia, but also in the Ivory Coast,24 the Democratic Republic of Congo,25 Sierra Leone,26 and Central African Republic.27 Most of this
illegal natural resource exploitation activity is likely to occur in three
maritime zones: the Territorial Zone, the Continental Shelf, and the Exclusive Economic Zone, each of which are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.28

22. Mats Berdal & David M. Malone, Introduction to GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC
AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 1 (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000) (highlighting the
incidental connection between armed conflicts and natural resource exploitation in Africa);
MICHEL T. KLAIRE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT 190 (2002)
(describing the increasing primacy of natural resource exploitation agendas in African
wars); NICO SHRIJVER, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DESTRUCTION: THE UN AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 159–185 (2010) (discussing the increasing importance within the
United Nations of the connection between natural resource exploitation and armed conflict
in Africa).
23. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 528 (using the term “economi[z]ation of conflict”). See
also Thomas Renner, The Anatomy of Resource Wars 162 WORLDWATCH PAPER (October 2002)
at 5, 7–9 (stating that the contemporary landscape of conflicts, particularly in Africa, thrives
around contests based on control or exploitation of existing natural resources, and not ideological differences); see also MICHAEL WALLACE NEST, FRANCOIS GRIGNON & EMIZET F. KISANGANI, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF WAR AND PEACE 1
(2006); see also KLAIRE, supra note 22, at 190; Ingrid Samset, Conflict of Interests or Interests in
Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC, 93/94 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 463, 467–69 (2002).
24. See Rep. of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security
Council Resolution 1584 (2004), ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. S/2005/699 (Nov. 7, 2005). See also
Trafigura Found Guilty of Exporting Toxic Waste, BBC (July 23, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-10735255 (discussing illegal dumping of toxic waste).
25. See generally Reps. of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, S/2001/357(April 12, 2001), S/2002/
565 (May 22, 2002), S/2002/1072 (Nov 13, 2001), S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002) and S/2003/
1027 (Oct. 28, 2003).
26. The Special Court of Sierra Leone indicted Charles Taylor for various war crimes
and crimes against humanity, including using financial and military means in order to
obtain illegal access to Sierra Leone’s mineral resources. See generally Prosecutor v. Charles
Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Indictment (Spec. Court Sierra Leone May 29,
2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=afhF3nXfC%2bY%3d&tabid=159.
27. See International Crisis Group, Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic, (Dec. 16, 2000), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/167-dangerous-little-stones-diamonds-in-the-central-africanrepublic.aspx. See also Central African Republic Rebels Take Diamond Mine, BBC NEWS (Dec.
18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20775788.
28. See infra Part I.
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This article examines the legal rights and responsibilities of maritime states and other states within these zones, and investigates whether
the relevant international legal and institutional frameworks can be relied upon to prevent illegal natural resource exploitation of Africa’s maritime zones during periods of armed conflict. Part I discusses the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which outlines the rights of
states in specific maritime zones. Part II provides a brief case study of
political instability and consequent criminal activity in Somalia as a
prime example of the ineffectiveness of applicable international law and
explores the international community’s lack of response to such exploitation. Part III scrutinizes the current legal framework by assessing its ability to criminalize illicit natural resources exploitation, and details the
efforts by leaders in Africa to combat this criminal activity. The article
concludes that the illicit exploitation of African natural resources should
constitute a war crime under international criminal law, and that the current efforts by leaders in Africa are a strong step toward combating this
exploitation.
I. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) regulates economic activity in maritime zones.29 In general
terms, UNCLOS is important in controlling economic activity in three
problematic maritime zones: the Territorial Waters, the Exclusive Economic Zones, and the Continental Shelf. Within the framework of UNCLOS, states are required to preserve these zones or claim extended
portions of them. One of the motivations for this is that these zones yield
critical natural resources such as coral sponges, oysters, pearl shell, bottom fish, and prawn, and also contain minerals such as gold, copper,
zinc, coal, oil, and manganese nodules.30 Technological advances have
enhanced corporations’ capability to exploit these minerals, which have
been considered impossible to extract for the past 40 years.31 The progressive depletion of land-based resources has triggered a shift to extrac-

29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview
_convention.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS].
30. Barry B. Omo Ikirodah, The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf, its Economic Importance and the Vast Natural Resources of a Coastal State, 23 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 15,
16–18 (2005).
31. See HELMUT TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 12 (2012).
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tion of oceanic reserves, particularly in the continental shelf.32 Provisions
of UNCLOS offer less comprehensive, and generally ineffective, responses to illegal exploitation of natural resources in zones where maritime states are caught in conflict and are unable to address criminal
activity under domestic law.
A. The Territorial Waters
UNCLOS requires states to restrict their operations to a territorial
zone not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the land (defined as the low
watermark along the coast) into the sea.33 The sovereignty of the coastal
state extends into these waters, the airspace above, and the seabed and
subsoil beneath.34 Furthermore, in accordance with UNCLOS, the coastal
state’s laws and regulations apply in the territorial zone.35 Thus, the laws
of African maritime states should prevail in issues of natural resource
management and exploitation. At the same time, however, according to
UNCLOS, the laws of these states must yield to applicable international
rules in territorial zones.36 Thus, ships and aircraft of all states have the
right of “innocent passage” through the territorial sea and the sea’s
airspace.37
Article 19 of UNCLOS defines “innocent passage” to mean passage that “is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State,” and that such passage shall take place in conformity with
UNCLOS and “other rules of international law.”38 Among activities
which do not constitute innocent passage are: (1) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person contrary to customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;39 (2)
acts of willful and serious pollution contrary to UNCLOS;40 and (3) any
fishing operations.41 These rules explicitly recognize the illegality of fish-

32. Geoffrey P. Glasby, Lessons Learned from Deep-Sea Mining, SCIENCE MAGAZINE, July
28, 2000, at 551, 551–53, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/289/5479/551.
33. See UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 3 (providing that the breadth of a state’s territorial sea should be up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this Convention); Id. at art. 4 (providing for the outer limit
of the territorial sea to be the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest
point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea).
34. See UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 2.
35. Id. at art. 21, ¶ 1.
36. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 3.
37. See id. at arts. 17, 38.
38. UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 19, ¶ 1.
39. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2(g).
40. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2(h).
41. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2(i).
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ing activities and the dumping of wastes by foreign ships. The UNCLOS
prohibition of surveys42 and other acts that are unrelated to the passage
of ships43 suggests that other natural resource extraction activities are
specifically prohibited.
B. The Exclusive Economic Zone
African maritime states exercise limited rights over the Exclusive
Economic Zone (“EEZ”), an area defined to represent the area “beyond
and adjacent to the territorial sea,”44 which extends a maximum of 200
nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial zones.45 UNCLOS provides that a coastal state has exclusive rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage living and non-living natural resources above the
seabed, on the seabed, and in the subsoil, as well as rights to “other economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as production of
energy from water, currents, and winds.”46 The coastal state may also
pass laws and regulations in conformity with UNCLOS to regulate these
activities in the EEZ.47 Such laws and regulations empower the coastal
state “to take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest, and
judicial proceedings as may be necessary to ensure compliance.”48 With
respect to the EEZ, however, other states enjoy “the freedoms . . . of navigation and over-flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft
and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”49 Despite an element of shared, albeit limited
use of the EEZ, the UNCLOS prohibition of natural resource exploitation
activity by other states is clear.
C. The Continental Shelf
UNCLOS regulates the continental shelf of maritime states in such
manner as to avoid and prevent disputes that arise from competing
claims to the shelf by different states.50 The continental shelf represents
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond each state’s terri42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2(l).
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 55.
Id. at art. 57.
Id. at art. 56, ¶ 1.
See id. at art. 73.
Id. at art. 73, ¶ 1.
UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 58.
See UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 25. See generally TUERK, supra note 26.
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torial zone.51 UNCLOS defines the shelf as the seabed and submarine
areas that extend beyond the natural prolongation of land to the outer
edge of the continental margin, or, where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance, a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.52 In the continental shelf, the coastal state has “exclusive sovereign rights” to explore and exploit natural resources.53 If the coastal
state is unable to carry out the exploration and exploitation, another state
may exercise these rights only by obtaining the consent of the coastal
state.54
Having explored the nature of legal rights exercisable by states in
the identified maritime zones, it is critical to identify the major obstacles
likely to be encountered by African states in enforcing international legal
rights using the applicable international institutional framework.
II. OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS
For the past three decades, the efficacy of international law enforcement and the success of institutional mechanisms established to address particular transnational problems in Africa have depended in very
large part on the support of Western states and organizations.55 This support ranges from financial, technical skills assistance, human and technological resource support, and even moral support.56 This is quite
surprising since African governments have shown a desire, at least on
paper, to have an approach that advocates for African solutions to African problems,57 and consequently seem prepared to fully support established institutions aimed at addressing particular problematic issues
during both war and peace. Indeed, in confronting the scourge of war
and its problematic aspects on the continent, African states, through the
African Union, constantly feel that they have a deeper role to play in

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
(2007).
56.

UNCLOS, supra note 29, at art. 76, ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at art. 77, ¶ 1.
Id. at art. 77, ¶ 2.
See Max du Plessis & Lee Stone, A Court not Found?, 7 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 522, 533

See NICO SHRIJVER, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT DESTRUCTION: THE UN AND GLOBAL REMANAGEMENT 159–85 (2010).
57. See UNSC S/PV.4317 and S/PV.4318, where African states fiercely debated and
argued for this approach during a session of the Security Council. This Security Council
session was conducted at the height of the illicit natural resource exploitation crisis of the
Congo wars between 2001 and 2003.
SOURCE
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shaping African politics and determining Africa’s relations with international institutions.58
The most disturbing concern arising from overreliance on support
from Western states is that such states are less eager to lend support and
offer assistance where the transnational problems are traceable to entities
domiciled in the Western states.59 Thus, where corporations domiciled in
Western states are implicated in illicit transnational criminality, those
Western host states have been slow to take decisive action that would
benefit African states.60 Without action from those host states, the implicated corporations would most likely continue with their illicit natural
resource exploitation activities, and affected African states would be unable to combat such criminality due to the state of war and institutional
collapse. The crisis in Somalia provides a prime case study and necessitates a discussion.
A. Case Study: Exploitation of Conflict in Somalia
Somalia has not enjoyed absolute peace in the past three decades,
with hostile political conditions giving rise to the notorious problem of
piracy on the East African coast.61 Piracy has exacerbated the dire political conditions in Somalia; a state that has experienced intermittent bursts
of civil conflict and a general lack of any single or dominant political elite
since 1991.62 Various warlords continually forced Somalia into anarchy
and violence by exercising informal forms of political power over several
provinces, towns, and cities.63 The lack of a governing political authority
perpetuated a power vacuum, and the right to fill the void was viciously

58. See Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants, 2–5, INST. FOR
SEC. SERVICES 2010, available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono172.pdf.
59. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct. 15, 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 141, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16,
2002).
60. Id.
61. See Panjabi, supra note 9, at 377–491 (2010).
62. Alison K. Eggers, When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland, 30
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 211–22 (2007).
63. See Somali Warlords Form Unity Council, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2001), http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1235434.stm. These warlords do not operate as well organized political and militarized groups, making them difficult to trace, identify, or study individually. They are rather random, incongruent, and sometimes temporary militia groups that
disband as soon as they achieve a particular political or military objective. Further, they do
not constitute themselves into recognizable political elements in Somalia, and are notorious
for refusing to come into the open and participate in the major currents that define
Somalia’s political landscape. See also Somalia’s Warlords: Feeding on a Failed State, GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/1
73/30467.html.
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contested by warlords and sectorial militias.64 By the turn of the century,
the consequent demise of judicial, administrative, and security infrastructure had virtually crippled Somalia’s administrative system, leaving
Somalia unable to fight the criminals feeding off of the prevailing political instability.65
In 2004, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government was established66—primarily through the efforts of Kenya and other states in the
region—as a transitional, inclusive political arrangement formed for the
purpose of working toward permanent government, political stability,
and peace. The Transitional Federal Government attempted to plug the
power vacuum and bring a semblance of order, but in reality failed to
bring “government” to Somalia.67 By 2012, when Somalia elected President Hassan Mammud Sheikh to power, political developments had not
succeeded in creating any single and effective state administrative system in Somalia, and political administration was still shared among local
warlords, militias, Islamic militants, Ethiopian authorities, and African
Union authorities.68 The lack of effective security, combined with the lack
of an administrative apparatus with national authority and jurisdiction,
played into the hands of criminal gangs and organized crime from
within Somalia and other parts of Africa and Europe.69 Subsequently, it
was claimed that a consequence of collapsed security infrastructure and
ineffective administration was the rise in illicit activities by both foreign

64. See Eggers, supra note 62, at 211–22.
65. See generally U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, Dec.
30 2010, U.N. Doc. S/2010/675, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e2ebc
f42.html (detailing the fragile political situation in Somalia in 2010 and further painting a
gloomy picture on the security, humanitarian, and human rights situation in Somalia).
66. STEPHANIE HANSON & EBEN KAPLAN, SOMALIA’S TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (Council on Foreign Relations 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475. See also International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali
Coast, Piracy off the Somali Coast (Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN to Somalia Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah) Final Report: Assessment and Recommendations, 11 Nairobi (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.imcsnet
.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf.
67. Int’l Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, supra note 66, at 11. See also
Bilyana Tsvetkova, Securitizing Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 3.1 CENT. EUROPEAN J. INT’L
SEC. STUDIES 44, 47 (2009) available at http://www.cejiss.org/sites/default/files/TsvetkovaPiracy_in_Somalia.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
68. See Somali Election of Hassan Sheikh a ‘Great Step,’ BBC NEWS (Sep. 11, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19557884.
69. HANSON & KAPLAN, supra note 66; see also Kathryn Westcott, ‘Pirate’ Death Puts
Spotlight on ‘Guns for Hire,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2013), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa
/8585967.stm (suggesting the possible hiring of private security corporations by commercial ships that used international sea lanes near the East coast).
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and domestic actors in Somali waters.70 One writer succinctly captured
the relationship between collapsed government, piracy, and illegal natural resource exploitation:
Somalia provides an important case study of the nexus between environmental devastation and consequent criminal actions against international targets. Although the piracy is
entirely criminal and totally unjustifiable, it is understandable,
given the political and economic background. Somalia also
provides a case study of brazen violations of international law,
both by the Somalis and by foreigners, who have taken advantage of the absence of effective government, to wreak environmental havoc on the weakened nation. Although the Somali
pirates can be termed “predators,” it must be appreciated that
their country has suffered at the hands of predators from
many nations who have polluted their waters with toxic and
even nuclear waste and looted their oceans of fish.71

Somalia’s background provides a clear illustration of the relationship between political instability and maritime crime. Political instability
weakens institutional response mechanisms and diverts national crimefighting resources to other critical commitments. This reality is well-appreciated by criminal networks that profit from small arms dealing,
piracy, money laundering, and related corrupt behavior.72 Studies of ‘resource wars’ in Africa have shown that corporations wishing to exploit
natural resources rely on these criminal networks to maximize their illicit
activities in conflict-torn states.73 With little security and legal infrastructure in maritime states, home states in which the corporations are registered have a duty to scrutinize illicit activities and expose corporations to
criminal sanctions. However, as will be illustrated below, their response
mechanisms and other associated international responses to corporate
exploitation of Africa’s resources have been far from satisfactory.

70. Najad Abdullahi, ‘Toxic waste’ Behind Somali Piracy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 2, 2013), http:/
/www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html.
71. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 377, 382.
72. RAEYEMAEKERS, supra note 16, at 7–8.
73. Laurence Juma, The War in Congo: Transnational Conflict Networks and the Failure of
Internationalism, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 97, 102–03 (2006) (discussing the role of transnational
conflict networks and multinational corporations); see also RAEYMAEKERS, supra note 16.

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN103.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 13

25-APR-14

ILLICIT NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION

8:50

193

B. Lack of International Accountability
Most of the private corporations involved in the exploitation of
African natural resources are registered in European states,74 and, in
comparison to African states, the legal systems of these states have more
effective regulatory mechanisms to prevent illegal economic activities in
their own local waters. Illicit fishing, dumping, smuggling, illegal trafficking, and violation of control and monitoring systems in European
maritime states are extremely rare because such countries are likely to
adopt, use, and implement sophisticated technology and stringent policing strategies to combat maritime criminality.
The greatest obstacle to preventing the maritime exploitation of
African resources is the reluctance of European and North American
governments to impose a stricter regulatory framework on corporations
that are involved in illicit dumping and illegal fishing in the waters of
politically unstable African countries. Complaints by conflict-torn states
that illegally exploited natural resources are entering the developed
world’s markets generate insufficient alarm to the international community.75 This lack of international alarm is considerably problematic because multinational corporations that are headquartered in developed
countries are most often implicated in the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources from conflict states.76
74. See Rep. of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, Part IV S/2002/1072 (listing mostly EU
states). See also JEROEN CUVELIER & TIM RAEYMAEKERS, INTERNATIONAL PEACE INFORMATION
SERVICE, SUPPORTING THE WAR ECONOMY IN DRC: EUROPEAN COMPANIES AND THE COLTAN
TRADE, (Jan. 2002) (relating to multinational corporations implicated in illicit activities during the Congo conflict).
75. See SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jun. 3, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm
(In 2010, the United States responded by including Section 1502 in its Dodd-Frank Act,
which targets U.S. registered companies importing mineral resources from Congo. The section was inserted due to concerns that the exploitation and trading of conflict minerals
imported by these companies was being carried out by armed groups and directly helped
to finance the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo region, while further contributing to an emergency humanitarian crisis.).
76. See Corporate Social Responsibility: Movements and Footprints of Canadian Mining and Exploration Firms in the Developing World, 10 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF RESOURCE CONFLICT (Oct. 30, 2012) http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/miningwatch.ca/
files/CSR_Movements_and_Footprints.pdf (observing in figure 6 that Canadian mining
companies, for instance, were responsible for committing 60 percent of “infractions” associated with community conflict in areas they operate such as Congo). See also CUVELIER &
RAEYMAEKERS, supra note 74, at 25 (on the complicity of European companies); see also Marcel Colla & Georges Dallemagne, La Commision D’Enquête “Grand Lacs,” Comission
d’enquête parlementaire chargée d’enquêter sur l’exploitation et le commerce légaux et illégaux de
richesses naturelles dans la région des Grands Lacs au vu de la situation conflictuelle actuelle et de

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN103.txt

194

unknown

Seq: 14

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

25-APR-14

8:50

[Vol. 54

An example of this occurred in Congo, where European states
were reluctant to scrutinize the transnational activities of the multinational corporations that were exploiting Congo’s natural resources during conflict from 2000 to 2005.77 The developed world feared that more
intrusive regulation in Africa’s conflict zones would obstruct trade,78 and
that the use of import controls, monitoring, and policing were not the
responsibility of individual states, but of the European Union.79 Other
states claimed that the European Union was the only authority that
could enforce declarations affecting trade flows in ways that would not
affect legitimate trade.80 Most of the European Union states deflected attention to the private sector, claiming that the burden was on corporations to ensure they did not exacerbate the war through unethical
transactions in Congo.81
The response of developed states suggests they cannot be relied
upon to impose restrictive measures against their own corporations or to
scrutinize corporate activity in African conflict states. It can be argued
that in view of the stronger technical institutions, investigative agencies,
and crime fighting infrastructure in Europe and North America, it is an
easier task for those countries to investigate corporations involved in
trade and trafficking of mineral resources from Congo and other African
states than for conflict-torn states to investigate the complicated involvement of multinational corporations in their illicit war economies.82

l’implication de la Belgique, available at http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/publications/
viewPub&TID=33621897&LANG=fr (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
77. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct. 15, 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146, ¶ 141(October 16,
2002) [hereinafter “S/2002/1146”] (Panel of Experts reports identified 17 end-user countries
in Asia, Middle East, Europe, and North America, while countries representing processing
centers and major consumer markets for Congo’s primary commodities and natural resources included Belgium, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Thailand, the United
Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.); see also NEST ET. AL, supra note
23, at 69 (stating the actions of France, United States, and the United Kingdom in relation to
Congo’s conflict resources were never transparent, but were acts of “hypocrisy” intended
to apply pressure on Congolese actors while disguising the deep involvement of European
and North American multinational corporations in natural resource exploitation).
78. S/2002/1146, supra note 77, at ¶ 141.
79. Id. at ¶ 143.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Congo’s mineral resources include: copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, tantalum, tin,
coltan, zinc, cassirite, iron ore, uranium, and silver. The 2010 Mapping Exercise Report of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights illustrates that Congo alone
accounts for 17 percent of global production of diamonds and its Katanga copper belt contains 34 percent of the world’s cobalt and 10 percent of the world’s copper. Office of the
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III. SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICT EXPLOITATION
UNCLOS clearly defines the rights of maritime states to certain
maritime zones, and leaves no doubt as to the regulations to be followed
by foreign actors engaging in economic activities in the zones. UNCLOS
empowers maritime states to make laws and institute measures to safeguard their resources from theft and predation by foreign actors. There is
no doubt, then, that involvement of foreign state and non-state actors
within these waters is a violation of international law that should be addressed under UNCLOS.83 Further, such economic activity during periods of armed conflict should constitute the war crime of pillaging or
appropriation of property, which is recognized under the international
criminal jurisdiction regime established by the Rome Statute framework.84 The following sections explore how the provisions of this international criminal justice framework are important in the prosecution of
implicated persons and corporations, and describe the concurrent efforts
to protect against this illegal activity, specifically the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy.
A. International Criminal Law
While the illicit activities of corporations seem to succeed under
the guise of war, the largest problem with respect to illegal natural resource exploitation is that such activities are not currently classified as
war crimes under international criminal law. In order to impose international criminal liability, the governing principles of international criminal law require that a corporation be a party to prevailing hostilities or
be directly connected to any of the parties participating in ongoing

High Comm’r for Human Rights, Dem. Rep. Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise
Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and
June 2003, ¶ 729 (August 2010).
83. Disputes between states do not immediately attract penalties. States are required
to settle their disputes by peaceful means, for instance through arbitration procedures of
their choice or by bringing the case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), the International Court of Justice, or a special tribunal. These tribunals mete out
the penalties, which are primarily in the form of payment of reparations.
84. The Rome Statute is an international treaty that was formulated in 1999 with the
objective of creating a permanent international criminal court. The treaty entered into force
in July 2002, upon the deposition of the required ratifications, and the International Criminal Court was subsequently established in the same year. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Jul. 1, 2002) available at http://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
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wars.85 These illegal natural resource exploitation activities will continue
to fall outside the ambit of war crimes unless and until there is proof that
parties to the conflict conducted them in furtherance of the commission
of war crimes, or that the corporations involved are owned by parties to
the conflict. Further, for the activity to be considered a war crime under
the current regime, there must be proof that the activity is a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable to international armed
conflict.86
Even though criminal liability cannot be imposed under the current regulatory framework, illicit economic exploitation by corporations
should be considered a war crime. Under the Elements of Crime of the
Rome Statute,87 the Prosecutor is required to establish whether the illegal
natural resource exploitation activities in question occurred “in the context of” and were “associated” with either an international armed conflict
or non-international armed conflict, whichever would be the case.88 Furthermore, it has been held that “the existence of an armed conflict must,
at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability
to commit [the crime], his decision to commit it, the manner in which it
was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.”89 It should
also be shown that “the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the
guise of the armed conflict . . . to conclude that his acts were closely

85. For criminal liability under the international criminal justice regime, see Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 743 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2008); see also Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Liability in Article 25 ICC
Statute 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 957 (2007).
86. Id. See also Updated Statute of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Art.
1, (Sep. 2009) available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_
sept09_en.pdf; Statute of the Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda, Art. 1, (Jan. 31, 2010) available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf.
87. See Int’l Crim. Court, Elements of Crimes, Art. 8, ICC-ASP/1/3 (2011) available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20jour
nal/Pages/elements%20of%20crimes.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
88. In the Katanga and Chui case the International Criminal Court endorsed an earlier
view that this element is fulfilled “when the alleged crimes were closely related to the
hostilities.” Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 380 (September 30 2008), http://http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc571253.pdf. The Katanga case followed the early view of the ICC. See Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 288 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf.
89. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic, Case No. ICC IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment,
¶ 58, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2002) http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN103.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 17

25-APR-14

ILLICIT NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION

8:50

197

related to the armed conflict.”90 Corporations involved in illicit natural
resource exploitation can be directly linked with parties to the prevailing
conflict in situations where the corporations belong to conflict actors.91
Furthermore, these activities can and should be viewed as being committed in furtherance of war crimes because they enable parties of the conflict to continue to conduct war, partly due to the weakened
infrastructure of the African state, and thus corporations should be subject to international criminal jurisdiction under the war crimes doctrine.
Unfortunately, under the Rome Statute, the International Criminal
Court92 (“ICC”) has criminal jurisdiction over natural persons only; juridical entities such as corporations are exempt.93 Therefore, corporations
aligned to the conflict are not prosecutable, per se, under the criminal
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute framework as it currently stands. However, this does not prohibit some states from adopting particular legal
principles of international criminal law in their domestic criminal codes
and applying them to corporations that are exploiting natural resources.
State parties to the Rome Statute can thus confront the problem of corporate immunity by providing mechanisms in their domestic criminal
codes aimed at exposing corporations to criminal sanctions if it can be
established that such corporations committed particular transgressions.94
Such domestic criminal law must permit the prosecution of both natural
and juristic persons in courts, meaning corporations and the natural persons who operate them would be exposed to criminal sanctions. Accordingly, domestic criminal jurisdictions could use such laws to prosecute
corporate entities. Such an approach can be taken once it becomes clear
that the illicit activities in question constitute war crimes, either because

90. Id. at ¶ 58. See also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, & Imanishimwe, Case No.
ICTR-99-46-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 793, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 25, 2004).
91. A clear example is German corporations that were implicated and convicted of
committing the war crime of looting and economic spoliation since they were linked with
the Nazi imperial state during the Second World War. See The IG Farben Trial, 10 L. REPS.
TRIALS WAR CRIMS., 44–45 (1949), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-10.pdf [hereinafter The IG Farben Trial].
92. The International Criminal Court is the international court created under the Rome
Statute treaty for the prosecution of four major international crimes, namely aggression,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is based in The Hague, Netherlands.
Int’l Crim. Court, About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/About%20the
%20Court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
93. Rome Statute, supra note 84, at Art. 25(1).
94. See generally Andrew Clapham, The Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking
Beyond Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organizations, Corporations and States,
in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
IN A WORLD OF STATES 233, 239 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004).
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parties to the conflict committed them to further the commission of war
crimes, or because the corporations belong to a party in conflict.
Illicit natural resource exploitation has been criminalized before:
the post-World War II Nuremberg International Tribunal (“NIT”) focused on illicit economic exploitation by private actors who were linked
to conflicts. The NIT’s rulings show that natural persons directing corporate entities that are involved in illicit exploitation have been held criminally liable for their activity.95 In the IG Farben case,96 the Tribunal
adopted the term “spoliation” to describe the nature of “plunder,” “pillage,” and other illegal forms of dispossession of public or private property during the war.97 The Tribunal specifically stated that the term
“spoliation”:
is used interchangeably with the words ‘plunder’ and ‘exploitation.’ It may therefore be properly considered that the
term ‘spoliation’ . . . applies to the widespread and systemati[z]ed acts of dispossession and acquisition of property
in violation of the rights of the owners which took place in
territories under the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi
Germany during World War II. We consider that ‘spoliation’
is synonymous with the word ‘plunder’ as employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offen[s]es
against property in violation of the laws and customs of war of
the general type charged in the Indictment.98

The IG Farben case and many cases that followed demonstrate that
corporations have been implicated for various forms of economic exploitation under international criminal law based on their role, participation, and connection to parties to the conflict.99 The NIT has imposed
criminal liability on individuals responsible for operating entities, such
95. See The IG Farben Trial, supra note 91, at 44–45.
96. In the IG Farben case, representatives of IG Farben, a German private company,
were convicted of pillage for purchasing land, buildings, machinery, equipment from a
French factory, which the Nazi German Ministry of Economics had seized. Six directors of
the IG Farben firm were held criminally liable for pillaging the Strassbourg Schiltigheim
oxygen and acetylene plants in Alsace-Lorraine on the basis that the German civil administration’s decree confiscating the plants was “without any legal justification under international law.” The company’s directors were liable because they acquired such plants from
the Nazi Government without payment to or consent of the French owners. Id. at 21.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 44–45.
99. See JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING THE PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 77 (William Kramer et al., eds., 2011). See also The Flick Trial, 9 L. REPS.
TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 1, 21–24 (1947), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-9.pdf [hereinafter The Flick Trial]; and Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn
Krupp Von Bohlen und Halback and Eleven Others, 10 L. REPS. TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 69, 150
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as multinational corporations, for the purposes of conflict exploitation.100
According to the NIT, the laws of war are “binding no less on private
individuals than upon government officials and military personnel,”101
and “[o]fficers, directors, or agents of a corporation participating in a violation of law in the conduct of the company’s business may [thus] be
held criminally liable individually therefor.”102 The NIT’s specific views
on multinational corporations were that “when the corporation itself is
forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors
and to each director, separately and individually.”103 The NIT rejected
the notion of corporate liability, but specifically sanctioned targeting the
directors of corporations for criminal prosecution.104
The NIT also endorsed the approach of discarding the corporate
veil, and exposed individual officers and directors of corporations to individual criminal liability for their role in the illegal natural resource exploitation activities of the corporation.105 Even though war crimes are
usually committed by individuals using the corporation as a smokescreen, prosecutors seek to pierce the corporate veil by focusing on the
individuals driving the company.106 For example, in IG Farben, the NIT
held that criminal responsibility is personal and not based on membership in a group by stating that individual criminal “responsibility does
not automatically attach to an act proved to be criminal merely by virtue
of a defendant’s membership” of a corporation’s board of directors, and
that corporate structure cannot be utilized “to achieve an immunity from

(1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-10
.pdf [hereinafter The Krupp Trial].
100. See The Flick Trial, supra note 99, at 21–24; see The Krupp Trial, supra note 99, at
150.
101. The Krupp Trial, supra note 99, at 150.
102. Id. (quoting 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 649 (1940)).
103. Id.
104. See LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 56 (James Crawford et al., eds., 2002) (Arguing “[w]hile the Nuremberg
Charter recognized for the first time the possibility of individual criminal responsibility
under international law based on membership in a criminal group, it did not empower the
International Military Tribunal to hold organizations as such criminally responsible. Indeed, the primary aim of this Tribunal was not to criminalize organizations, but to convict
individuals against whom other evidence might be lacking.”).
105. See STEWART, supra note 99, at 77 (“[T]here is little doubt that the traditional approach to prosecuting commercial actors for international crimes involves dispensing with
the corporate entity and assessing whether individual business representatives satisfy requirements for regular modes of liability such as aiding and abetting, instigating or direct
perpetration.”).
106. William Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices,
83.842 INT. REV. OF THE RED CROSS 439, 453 (2001).
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criminal responsibility for illegal acts” that an officer of the corporation
“directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets.”107
Therefore, the current approach to this issue is to hold the directors and senior management personnel of corporations individually
criminally liable if it is clear that they participated in exploitation by
sanctioning, authorizing, and directing the carrying out of such activity.
The rationale is that
corporations act through individuals and, under the conception of personal individual guilt . . ., the Prosecution to discharge the burden imposed upon it . . ., must establish by
competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual
defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that,
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.108

Criminal liability further attaches when a corporation’s officers,
agents, or employees act within the scope of their employment duties
and with the intent to benefit the corporation.109 Thus, liability attaches to
this class of defendants despite the fact that they carried out the illegal
acts for “organizational,” not personal, ends, and despite the fact that key
decisions to exploit resources were “supported by operational and organi[z]ational subcultures, contingencies and priorities.”110 If a corporation’s object and purpose is acquisition, commercialization, trafficking,
and exportation of natural resources outside the existing legal or regulatory framework, the specific responsibility and participation of the directors of the corporation is scrutinized.
The acts that are scrutinized are not only those carried out in violation of criminal law, but those that breach civil, administrative, and
other applicable regulations.111 Accordingly, in circumstances where a
corporation is involved in illegal natural resource exploitation, the criminal case must be based on the fact that senior management personnel
systematically and deliberately authorized and sanctioned the exploita-

107. The IG Farben Trial, supra note 91, at 52.
108. Id.
109. A number of states, including the United States, recognize corporate criminal liability on the basis of the principle of “vicarious liability,” which attributes responsibility for
the actions of company employees to the corporation. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 190 (1998).
110. SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL 7–9 (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 2002).
111. According to one view, illegality by corporations and their agents “differs from the
criminal behavior of the lower socio-economic class principally in the administrative procedures which are used in dealing with the offenders.” See SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 9 (1949).
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tion activity during conflict, in violation of prescribed administrative and
governance processes.112 Furthermore, it is necessary to demonstrate that
such corporate representatives individually participated in the formulation, implementation, and supervision of illegal natural resource exploitation strategies and methods in the territorial waters of affected
states during conflict.
B. The 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy
The African Union has acknowledged threats and challenges to
Africa’s maritime zones and has sought to address them in various
ways. In December 2012, the Second Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Maritime-Related Affairs and the First High Level African
Maritime Cross-Sectoral Senior Officials met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
and adopted the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (“AIMS”).113
AIMS addresses various issues, including maritime safety, security arising from maritime threats and vulnerabilities, a framework for strategic
action, and maritime governance and legal regimes.114 AIMS acknowledges the need to create a Combined Exclusive Zone of Africa
(“CEMZA”),115 which would introduce a common information sharing
environment for African states. The ability to share information would
“allow for the convergence of existing and future monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety and security, protection of the
marine environment, fisheries control, trade and economic interests, border control and other law enforcement and defen[s]e activities.”116
CEMZA would also introduce regional policing mechanisms through enhanced “inter-agency/transnational cooperation and coordination on
maritime safety and security.”117
CEMZA would “grant Africa enormous cross-cutting geo-strategic, economic, political, social and security benefits, as it will engender

112. In IG Farben, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) defined “pillage” as when “private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former
owner.” The IG Farben Trial, supra note 91, at 44.
113. Press Release, African Union, The 2nd Conference of African Ministers in charge of
Maritime-related Affairs Consider the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050
AIM Strategy), No. 149 (Dec. 6, 2012) http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/Press%20Re
lease%20ENG.pdf. See African Union, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM
Strategy), http://pages.au.int/maritime/documents/2050-aim-strategy-0 (last visited Jun.
25, 2013) [hereinafter 2050 AIMS].
114. 2050 AIMS, supra note 113, at 7.
115. Id. at 15–16.
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id.
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collective efforts and reduce the risks of all transnational threats, environmental mismanagement, smuggling and arms trafficking.”118 The
framework for maritime safety and security would include establishment
of a naval security arm from the existing Africa Standby Force, a continental security group comprised of the chiefs of African navies.119 Regional, maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers would
also be established for purposes of “mutuali[z]ed response capabilities.”120 In order to deter illegal, unregulated fishing, AIMS supports the
imposition of inhibitive sanctions against offenders.121
AIMS is progressive and seems to adequately address the maritime problems faced by African states. It should be stated, however, that
AIMS is still a vision, and is not yet a binding framework of action. It
remains unclear when the institutions, mechanisms, and other strategies
listed in AIMS will come into being. Fortunately, the document’s provisions can be the foundation for practical action aimed at achieving and
enhancing maritime safety and security for the benefit of Africa’s
economy.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of armed warfare in Africa clearly shows that war and
illegitimate forms of commerce are both interconnected and devastating.
Various forms of illicit economic exploitation have followed the outbreak
of almost every armed conflict on the continent in the past two decades.
State and non-state actors have driven the resultant war economies, further linking up different criminal networks for the sole purpose of profiting from conflict. The phenomenon of illegal natural resource
exploitation is characterized not only by illicit acquisition and exploitation of marine resources, but also by dumping of toxic waste in territorial
waters of politically unstable states. These activities are difficult to police
in war-torn maritime zones because warfare and insecurity claims and
diverts all of the attention and resources of domestic crime fighting institutions. The inability of crime fighting institutions to police maritime resources in the region thus allows international corporations to escape
sanction for illegal exploitation of numerous natural resources.
African states do not take lightly the challenges posed by maritime resource exploitation. Various initiatives have been considered in
an attempt to plug institutional gaps and reduce exploitation. These ef118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 2050 AIMS, supra note 113, at 17.
121. Id. at 18 (The 2005 Rome Declaration against Illegal and Unregulated Fishing created this regime.).
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forts should be applauded as they are intended to defend Africa’s economic integrity during times of both war and peace. Such initiatives and
strategies are pivotal at a time when the exploitation of African maritime
resources is critical for economic growth and development.
There is a clear need for continuous review and overhaul of existing institutional and policing infrastructure if illicit maritime resource
exploitation during armed conflict is to be effectively addressed. The Africa Progress Panel has acknowledged the need for the reformation of the
“international infrastructure” so that there is increased accountability
and transparency within natural resource governance frameworks. These
noble objectives are achievable with the establishment of supranational
and regional institutions with the specific role of monitoring, policing,
and responding to complex war economies and illicit economic activities
at sea by private corporations during times of war.
An additional deterrent to illicit natural resource exploitation is
criminalizing the conduct as a war crime under the Rome Statute. Only
with such concerted efforts can it be guaranteed that criminal action by
international private corporations in African maritime zones will be effectively addressed. While not a panacea to the phenomenon, the regional approach envisioned by AIMS is likely to be effective in
diminishing the threat posed by illicit natural resource exploitation activities by private corporations in Africa’s maritime zones. In the meantime,
allowing governments to prosecute these corporate entities for illicit natural resource exploitation in maritime zones might prove to be the greatest strategy to effectively discourage this conduct in ongoing and future
conflicts in Africa.
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